Introduction
There are an increasing number of studies investigating people's preferences for environmental goods and services in developing countries. Due to the lack of sufficient data for revealed preference studies, they mostly rely on stated preference approaches. One issue of major importance with these approaches is the elicitation of the willingness to pay (WTP), an issue that poses many challenges. 1 One such challenge is the choice of the payment vehicle. As the majority of the population have no cash income and the exchange of goods and services is augmented through barter or work exchange, the role of money in a rural developing setting is likely to be different from what it is in an urban developed setting. Accordingly, it has been argued that contributions in the form of work time may seem more realistic for rural households in nonmonetized communities (see, e.g., Hardner 1996; Hung, Loomis, and Thinh 2007; Casiwan-Launio, Shinbo, and Morooka 2011) . According to previous findings from comparisons between labor-time and money contributions, acceptance rates for willingness to contribute (WTC) time are higher than for money (for a recent overview see Gibson et al. 2016) . These studies then conclude that in a rural developing setting, the labor-time payment vehicle is a valuable alternative to money. 2 It is plausible to assume that people mainly engaged in subsistence activities have fewer difficulties quantifying their disposable time budget than their disposable cash income. However, to our knowledge, there is no empirical evidence indicating whether respondents are actually more certain about their contribution when using labor time as the payment vehicle. The present study addresses this issue by analyzing and comparing uncertainty in connection with people's stated WTC time and money for a local public good in a nonmonetized small-scale community in Bougainville, Papua New Guinea. For this purpose, we use an alternative open-ended method where the WTC is measured as a range. This approach
Land Economics
explicitly allows for uncertainty in responses by eliciting upper and lower bounds of an individual's WTC.
The main justification for using range-WTC instead of classical point-WTC is the literature on preference uncertainty. Most of the contingent valuation studies analyzing and comparing WTC time and money in developing countries use the open-ended method and elicit the WTC as a single point (see, e.g., Swallow and Woudyalew 1994; Hardner 1996; Echessah et al. 1997; Kamuanga et al. 2001; Navrud, Tuan, and Tinh 2012; Arbiol et al. 2013; Vondolia et al. 2014) . 3 One of the drawbacks of estimating WTC as a single point is that it does not account for uncertainty of preferences. Previous contingent-valuation studies have shown that some people feel uncertain about their answers to valuation questions and are therefore unable to state a precise single point (e.g., Bateman et al. 2005; Håkansson 2008; Hanley, Kriström, and Shogren 2009) . Shaikh, Sun, and van Kooten (2007) outline a number of hypotheses on the causes for preference uncertainty, including (1) lack of experience or unfamiliarity with the good being valuated; (2) prices of both substitutes and complementary goods; (3) insufficient information about the hypothetical market presented in the questionnaire; (4) inability to make a trade-off between the commodity offered and their money, apart from the hypothetical nature of the exercise; (5) difficulty understanding the policy proposed and the way in which it would be achieved. Other arguments are that uncertainty is related to the fact that interviewees have insufficient time to think about the valuation task (Svedsater 2007) or caused simply by the fact that they are unsure about their own preferences (March 1978; Ariely, Loewenstein, and Prelec 2003; Gregory, Lichtenstein, and Slovic 1993; Jacowitz and Kahnemann 1995) . Due to vagueness of preferences, individuals frequently have regions of indifference instead of well-defined indifference curves (Loomes 1988; Butler and Loomes 2007, 2011) , a fact that challenges the validity of classical point-WTP (Dost and Wilken 2012; Hanley, Kriström, and Shogren 2009; Wang, Venkatesh, and Chatterjee 2007) . As a consequence, the classical contingent-valuation method may impose unrealistic cognitive demands on respondents. It is this point that at an early stage prompted Dubourg, Jones-Lee, and Loomes (1997) to argue in favor of analyzing WTP confidence intervals.
Studies based on closed-ended elicitation formats have estimated preference-uncertainty-adjusted WTP by using either numerical certainty scales or the polychotomous choice option (for a review see Akter, Bennett, and Akhter 2008) . Other studies have developed and refined the follow-up questions approach, either verbally (e.g., Johannesson, Liljas, and Johansson 1998; Blumenschein et al. 1998; Poe et al. 2002) or with certainty scores (Li and Mattson 1995; Champ et al. 1997) . Ready, Navrud, and Dubourg (2001) But as we said earlier, studies that compare WTC time and money in rural developing settings mostly use the open-ended method of estimating point-WTCs. Since our analysis relates to this type of literature, we use an alternative open-ended method, the range-WTC method, for comparison. In addition, we empirically explore the determinants of respondent uncertainty. According to Akter, Bennett, and Akhter (2008) , very little is known about this issue. In the context of this study, we expect risk aversion, apprehensive perception of tsunamis, and risk exposure to be significant predictors of uncertainty.
Our paper contributes to the existing contingent-valuation literature comparing payment vehicles by eliciting WTC as a single point. To our knowledge, we are the first to show that uncertainty decreases when respondents are asked for time contributions instead of money. As we use a measure of relative uncertainty, this result is valid independently of conversion issues. Accordingly, we provide empirical evidence that in nonmonetized communities the use of working time as a payment vehicle can produce more reliable welfare estimates than the use of money. Further, the present study provides empirical evidence pertaining to factors that explain uncertainty.
The Elicitation Approach
Building upon previous work in marketing science (Wang, Venkatesh, and Chatterjee 2007; Dost and Wilken 2012) , we follow first advances of Braun, Rehdanz, and Schmidt (2016) in nonmarket environmental valuation and establish the range-WTP method as an approach to the elicitation of preferences for nonmarket goods in nonmonetized communities. This measure is designed specifically to reflect the effects of uncertainty on purchase decisions. Figure 1 illustrates how range-WTC operates. In contrast to point-based WTC measures, the range strategy introduces two thresholds: a lower bound at or below which respondents would definitely contribute (choice probability of 1) and an upper bound at or above which respondents would no longer contribute (choice probability of 0). In the interval between the lower and upper bounds, respondents are indecisive about contributing (choice probability between 0 and 1). 4 The difference between these thresholds is the WTC range, which is 4 The procedure assumes that contribution probability decreases linearly between the lower bound and the upper bound.
indicative of the degree of uncertainty (Braun, Rehdanz, and Schmidt 2016; Maier, Wilken, and Dost 2015; Schlereth, Eckert, and Skiera 2012; Wang, Venkatesh, and Chatterjee 2007) .
In a setup involving 175 customers, Wang, Venkatesh, and Chatterjee (2007) test the range approach in an experimental elicitation of consumers' reservation prices for chocolate and red wine. They assume linear decreasing purchase probabilities between the lower bound (100%), the indifference range (50%), and the upper bound (0%). A lottery ensures incentive compatibility; for example, if the randomly drawn lottery price is lower than the lower bound, then the respondent must buy the good at the lottery price drawn. They conclude that in terms of predictive performance, the range-WTP performs better than pointbased methods, while also yielding up valuable information about uncertainty in product valuation. In line with Wang, Venkatesh, and Chatterjee (2007), Dost and Wilken (2012) also provide empirical evidence that "traditional" point-based methods measure expected WTP and neglect the individual uncertainty that exists even in connection with everyday products such as a cup of caffe latte. They argue that point-based methods produce biased pricing and hence poor-quality estimates of production capacities. Because this effect tends to grow with the variance caused by consumer uncertainty, they particularly recommend range-based methods both for new or unfamiliar products and for public goods. In a similar vein, Braun, Rehdanz, and Schmidt (2016) were the first to test whether range-WTP is consistent with theoretical expectations in eliciting WTP for nonmarket goods. In their contingent valuation study, Venkatesh, and Chatterjee (2007) and apply the range-based method for the elicitation of contributions to a hypothetical public good. Our interest in doing so is to compare the degree of uncertainty between monetary and labor-time contributions in a nonmonetized economy.
Methodology and Data

The Study Area
The data for our analysis come from a survey conducted in coastal villages in the northeastern part of Bougainville Island, Papua New Guinea, between October and November 2014. Bougainville is located on the Pacific Ocean and is exposed to a large number of natural hazards, including earthquakes and tsunamis. 5 In combination with low adaptive capacities and poor economic development opportunities, this makes the island state and its many coastal communities particularly vulnerable. Protective measures like tsunami evacuation routes have yet to be implemented.
We recruited our respondents from small settlements in the Tinputz district of the Teop community. Figure 2 shows a map of the area and the villages included in the study. Teop people live in villages that vary in size from 50 to 200 people and are located either along the coast or inland in the hills. 6 Subsistence is based on horticulture and pig husbandry, supplemented by fishing, hunting, and foraging (Regan and Griffin 2005) . Some of the sur-5 See http://earthquake.usgs.gov/learn/glossary/?termID =150. 6 In our sample, 82% of the respondents live in coastal villages, while 18% live in island villages (see also plus from the subsistence sector is marketed. Cocoa and copra are the main commercial crops. They are harvested several times a year and sold to intermediaries in one of the larger market towns on the coast. At present, there are hardly any opportunities for wage labor on Bougainville Island except for jobs in the government sector. Accordingly, most of the population have no regular cash income.
Cultural Context and Survey Implementation
Social life in Teop is regulated almost exclusively by social norms based upon egalitarian principles. As a result, decision-making processes affecting the community are bottom-up in nature. This kind of decision-making is widely accepted for the degree of stability and sustainability it has provided for many such communities, although it often has trouble coping with modern challenges such as rapid population growth, resource depletion, and the manifestations of climate change (see Aalbersberg, Tawake, and Parras 2005; Nunn 2009 ). When implementing the survey in the field, our study took explicit account of this specific type of decision-making process. Like many other nonmonetized and smallscale societies in Papua New Guinea, the Teops take an active part in community life, participating in activities such as communal garden work, communal house building, or fundraising. The Teop assemble on a regular basis for village meetings to discuss ongoing and potential projects of a communal nature. Under the aegis of the "Big Man" (village chief), villagers vote for or against these projects. This was the setting for our study. Before we implemented the household survey, our project was discussed in each (randomly selected) village but without any detailed information about the study design. 7 All selected villages agreed to take part in the study.
We know for a fact that villages give their approval only to projects that have a high prob-ability of realization and are deemed relevant. According to Vossler, Doyon, and Rondeau (2012) two assumptions underlie consequentiality: (1) participants care about the outcome of the proposed policy, and (2) respondents must view their responses as having a potential impact on the policy/outcome (see also Carson and Groves 2007, 183) . Assumption (1) holds, since all survey participants agreed that the project (an evacuation route) was very important or at least important for the community. Assumption (2) also holds, since community members could vote for or against the project in village meetings. This procedure is tantamount to a prereferendum. Accordingly, it was very likely that participants would view their responses as potentially influencing the outcome (i.e., decision on the construction of a tsunami evacuation route). Passing the prereferendum stage also implies that communities will enforce the realization of the project and that respondents have a perception of costs and benefits when indicating their contributions. In short, our elicitation method also conforms with the payment consequentiality condition in a broader sense.
Survey Design and Sampling
The questionnaire was structured as follows: First, respondents were informed about how tsunamis arise and the possible consequences of such an event for coastal communities in the area. Then the fact was brought home to them that people's lives could be saved by evacuation in the case of an emergency. 8 We gave a visual example of such an evacuation route and outlined the tasks associated with its implementation. 9 Then respondents were 8 The English translation of the information provided to the respondents can be found in Appendix Figure A1 .
9 It might be argued that describing the construction tasks in such detail will distract people from the actual welfare gain of reduced mortality risk when making their valuation. Another issue may be the missing quantification of reduced mortality risk or occurrence probabilities. While we cannot completely rule out any misspecification in the valuation of the public good, we do not expect respondents' perceptions of the welfare gains or risks to matter in this context as long as they do not systematically affect the payment vehicles (which is guaranteed by the randomization of participants). Thus, the validity of our main results (i.e., less uncertainty in labor-time contributions) holds.
Land Economics asked to imagine a hypothetical situation in which an evacuation route was to be constructed in their village. Subsequently they were asked about their willingness to support the construction of the route by contributing labor time or money. So as not to bias results, the order of the questions about monetary and labor-time contributions was randomized. We chose the following elicitation format: Respondents were always asked first to state a lower bound and then an upper bound for their willingness to contribute money and labor time (measured in hours). The lower bound was elicited by asking respondents to reveal the amount of money (hours) at or below which they would definitely be willing to contribute in order to support the construction of the evacuation route. The upper bound was elicited by asking respondents to reveal the amount of money (hours) at or above which they would definitely not be willing to actively support construction. 10 In addition to the elicitation of the willingness to contribute, we requested socioeconomic and demographic data from the respondents.
To ensure that all respondents fully understood both the contingent-valuation scenario and the question format, we hired local assistants to translate the questionnaire and to conduct the interviews. Some of these assistants were already experienced with translation tasks (Bible translators). To check for accuracy, we divided the assistants into two groups: one group translated the questionnaire into the local language, while the other group translated the survey questions back into English.
A total of 195 participants-102 male and 93 female-from various villages voluntarily participated in the interviews. Recruitment was done by compiling a random sample from a list of residents. In some cases, these lists were already available, in others we asked local village chiefs to draw one up. We made sure that at least one member from each household participated in the study. Invitations to participate were addressed to respondents one or two days in advance, sometimes on the same day. They were asked to come to 10 The English translation of the range-WTP questions can be found in Appendix Figure A2 . a central spot in the village (school or church) at a given time. To minimize collusion, we allowed only small groups of people to be present at these sessions.
The respondents were questioned in a face-to-face interview conducted by two local research assistants and supervised by the researchers. The interviews took place in a closed-off area (e.g., classroom) without any other person present. As we are interested in individual willingness to contribute money and labor, respondents were asked to answer the survey questions on their own behalf and not on behalf of their household units.
To instruct the assistants on how to conduct the interviews, we organized a three-day workshop in the field. Before the final interviews were conducted, the survey was discussed in focus groups and then pretested on a small sample of randomly selected respondents. The interviews were carried out in Tok Pisin, the most widely used language in Papua New Guinea.
Methodology
Before we compare the uncertainty factor in connection with monetary and labor-time contributions, we first present the socioeconomic and demographic features displayed by our respondents. Subsequently we report the descriptive statistics on the lower bound and the upper bound for each payment vehicle separately.
To compare uncertainty between labor-time and monetary contributions independently of conversion issues and the level of contributions, it was necessary to convert the information obtained from the survey participants. We specify uncertainty as the relative deviation of a lower bound from an upper bound. We tested the statistical uncertainty differential via a Wilcoxon signed-rank test. Finally, to confirm the robustness of the results, we ran ordinary least square regressions controlling for the socioeconomic and regional features of the respondent and the study area. The regression analysis also enables us to investigate factors determining the uncertainty of contributions. More specifically, we obtained information on respondents' risk preferences (four response categories ranging from "completely avoid to take risks" to "very willing to take risks") and their beliefs about future tsunami events (four response categories ranging from "not afraid at all" to "very afraid"). For our analysis we classified respondents as risk-averse or riskprone and as afraid of a tsunami event or not. Table 1 provides statistics on the respondents' age, education level, main activity, and daily working hours, 11 as well as their monthly cash 11 We asked respondents how many hours they work on a typical day.
Empirical Analysis and Results
Socioeconomic and Demographic Features of Respondents
incomes and the size of the households they live in. In addition to statistics for the sample as a whole, the table also provides information by gender. It is interesting to note that there are few differences between men and women regarding education, age, monthly cash income, and daily working hours, but significant differences with respect to main activities (χ 2 , p < 0.01). 12 Women play less of a role in farming and fishing, more of a role in housekeeping and teaching. There are no significant differences between men and women regarding risk preferences and beliefs about tsunami events (for risk aversion: χ 2 , p = 0.834; for tsunami apprehension: χ 2 , p = 0.13). 
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Descriptive Statistics on the Two Payment Vehicles Table 2 presents descriptive statistics on the lower and upper bounds of money and labor-time contributions, respectively. 13 Focusing on the monetary contributions first, the mean lower bound of 16.57 kina is close to the amount that people would get for a full day's work (18.42 kina). 14 A one-sample t-test confirms that the average amount participants would definitely contribute (lower bound) is statistically indistinguishable from the local average daily wage (16.57 vs. 18.42, p = 0.43). However, the mean upper bound of 43.21 kina is about 2.6 times larger than the lower bound. Turning to labor-time contributions, the mean lower bound of 4.04 hours is about one hour lower than the mean local daily working hours (4.99 h). 15 The difference is statistically significant (4.04 vs. 4.99, p < 0.01). Much as above, the mean upper bound for labor-time contributions is about 2.2 times larger than the local average. These statistics suggest that mean lower bounds for both payment vehicles are very close to a full day's work.
Uncertainty Comparison between the Two Payment Vehicles
As pointed out in previous studies comparing WTC time and money in developing coun- 13 Note that due to missing values, the number of observations differs slightly between the two payment vehicles.
14 We asked respondents to say how much they would pay others for a full day's work. The average payment per day is 18.42 kina (standard deviation = 6.66). 15 We asked respondents to say how much they work on average during the day. Respondents work 4.99 h on average (standard deviation = 3.27); see also To ensure that mean differences are not fudged by the different background character- 
where y i, j represents the uncertainty of respondent i for payment vehicle j as defined in equation [1] . The dummy variable D takes the value 1 for the labor payment vehicle and 0 for the monetary payment vehicle. The parameter γ captures the difference in uncertainty between the two payment vehicles. The vector i x contains a set of sociodemographic and regional features including gender, age, education level, household size, marital status, and daily working hours. β is a vector of parameters to be estimated. The intercept is denoted by a; i ε is the error term. Table 3 presents results from a simple ordinary least squares regression. The basic specification (1) controls for respondents' gender and the payment vehicle. Specification (2) extends the basic specification to include participants' daily working hours. In specification (3) we add further demographic and socioeconomic characteristics including cash income, education, age, marital status, main activity (primary occupation), household size, and head of household. 16 All specifications in- 16 Missing observations for some sociodemographic features reduce the sample for specification (3) from 386 to 363. For comparison purposes, we estimate all specifications with this reduced sample.
clude the following control variables: "village fixed effects" identifying the village where the respondent is living; "enumerator effects," a dummy variable identifying one of the two research teams conducting the interview; and "order effects," a dummy variable that takes on the value 1 if participants were asked for labor-money and 0 if they were asked for money-labor. 17 The regression results confirm our earlier findings based on descriptive statistics: significant uncertainty differences exist between labor-time and monetary contributions. The coefficient of the labor-time dummy is negative and highly significant in all specifications. Where respondents are asked for a labor-time contribution, uncertainty is reduced by about 11 percentage points compared to the elicitation via a monetary contribution. In none of the specifications does gender have an effect on uncertainty. Extending the model to control for further sociodemographic features of respondents, longer working hours significantly reduce uncertainty independently of the payment vehicle: one additional working hour per day reduces uncertainty by 1.3 percentage points. Accordingly, people who work longer than others during the day are less uncertain about their contributions. All other socioeconomic and demographic characteristics except for age have no significant impact on uncertainty. 18 Older respondents have significantly higher levels of uncertainty than younger ones.
To test the robustness of specification (3), we ran regressions in which we included additional factors that may influence uncertainty. 17 Enumerator effects are not significant in any of the specifications at conventional levels of significance. But we do find an order effect. Respondents asked for the payment set labor-money show significantly lower levels of uncertainty compared to those asked for the payment set money-labor. However, this order effect has no impact on the size or significance of the payment vehicle (the variable of interest in our analysis). To provide a robustness check, we also ran regressions restricting the data to the first question asked (see Appendix Table B1 ). This enables us to compare uncertainty of payment vehicles between subjects. The coefficient of the payment vehicle dummy is statistically significant and negative. Thus, our results remain robust. 18 We also varied the specification of income and education, but the coefficients were never significant and, more importantly, they did not affect our main variable of interest, the payment vehicle. 
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More specifically, we would expect less uncertainty from those who are more risk-averse, those who live in coastal villages, and those who are afraid of a tsunami event in the future. Table 4 shows the results of the robustness analysis. We find sizeable effects for the new control variables. In particular, people in coastal villages (column 1), individuals with higher levels of risk aversion (column 2), and people fearing a tsunami event (column 3) are significantly more certain about their contributions. These findings are as expected. However, the main finding remains: the coefficient of the payment-vehicle dummy is significant, negative, and similar in size to those figuring in previous regression models. Thus, respondents are significantly less uncertain when they are asked for labor-time contributions.
The results for the other control variables are unchanged.
Conclusion
In the context of rural households in developing countries, previous studies suggest the use of labor time as an alternative payment vehicle to money for the elicitation of WTC (see Hardner 1996; Hung, Loomis, and Thinh 2007; Casiwan-Launio, Shinbo, and Morooka 2011) . The aim of this paper is to address the issue of uncertainty in the comparison of people's stated WTC time and money for a local public good in a nonmonetized small-scale community. To avoid conversion issues, we define uncertainty as the relative deviation of the amount at or below which respondents would definitely contribute from the amount 195 + 191) . We include only nonmissing observations with respect to socioeconomic and demographic characteristics of the respondents.
* Statistical significance at the 10% level; ** at the 5% level; *** at the 1% level.
at or beyond which respondents definitely would not contribute. Using the range-WTC method in a contingent-valuation study, we find strong evidence that the degree of uncertainty is reduced in stated WTC when respondents are asked for working-time contributions instead of money. This is in line with our expectations about the subsistence character of nonmonetized communities. People rely mainly on labor-time input for contributions to communal projects such as gardening work or house building. The strong focus on working time in subsistence environments may reduce uncertainty about labor-time contributions over and against monetary contributions. In a similar vein, Vondolia et al. (2014) find that experience with the payment vehicle reduces asymmetries in acceptance rates.
We have also analyzed factors determining the degree of uncertainty. In line with expectations, people who have a greater workload during the day (e.g., working close to the daily maximum) are less uncertain about their contributions. This effect holds for both payment vehicles. It can be argued that people who work more (relatively) have less additional time to allocate and are therefore more certain about their contribution. Similarly, people with a higher work load are more likely to Note: An ordinary least squares regression has been fitted. Heteroskedasticity-robust clustered standard errors are reported in parentheses. Clusters are given by individuals. The dependent variable is uncertainty (relative deviation of lower bound from upper bound). Additional control variables are defined as follows: village fixed effects: dummy variable identifying the village where the respondent is living; enumerator effects: dummy variable identifying the enumerator who conducted the interview; order effects: dummy variable indicating the order of the question format (0 = money-labor, 1 = labor-money); additional socioeconomic variables: marital status (1 = married, 0 = other), main activity (farmer = 1, other = 0), household size, and head of household (head = 1, other = 0). a Due to missing values in the apprehension variable, observations in specification (3) do not add up to 364. * Statistical significance at the 10% level; ** at the 5% level; *** at the 1% level.
Land Economics have cash income. These people may thus be more certain about the value of money. 19 We find that risk-averse people are less uncertain about contributions. In economic theories, risk aversion is described as behavior designed to reduce uncertainty. 20 Our results suggest that risk-averse people have a greater dislike of uncertainty about tsunami events and the size of their associated costs (e.g., household damage, loss of harvest, mortality risk) than risk-seeking individuals. We also find that apprehensive people display less uncertainty about their contributions. This compares well with recent studies showing that emotions and beliefs play an important role in people's support for climate change policies (e.g., Roeser 2012; Smith and Leiserowitz 2014; Lu and Schuldt 2015) . Being afraid of a tsunami may lead to a clearer assessment of the risks and costs, thus reducing uncertainty about contributions. Finally, we find evidence that direct exposure to the risk of a tsunami (i.e., location of villages) is a predictor for respondent uncertainty. This is in line with previous studies showing that physical vulnerability-proximity to risks-influences risk perceptions (see, e.g., Peacock, Brody, and Highfield 2005; Brody et al. 2008; Lindell and Hwang 2008) . Accordingly, our findings provide valuable information for decision-makers in nonmonetized communities using cost-benefit analyses as a basis for decisions on environmental projects. However, our study has some potential shortcomings with respect to welfare estimations. First, although we have considered cultural specifics in the design of the contingent-valuation scenario, the study does not explicitly take consequentiality into account (see Vossler, Doyon, and Rondeau 2012). Respondents may not be convinced that their choices are consequential, so their stated willingness to contribute money and labor time may be biased. Respondents may also not clearly perceive the welfare gains of the 19 In our sample, working hours are significantly and positively correlated with monthly income (ρ = 0.14, p < 0.01). 20 We refer to expected utility theory, where risk attitudes are related to the utility respondents attach to their wealth. If the utility of wealth has the shape of a concave function, people are intrinsically averse to uncertainty about large losses (e.g., the damage associated with a tsunami event). tsunami evacuation route due to the fact that there is no quantification of reduced mortality risk in the contingent-valuation scenario. We believe, however, that these limitations have no effect on the validity of our main results (i.e., less uncertainty about labor-time contributions), which are the focus of our analysis.
It must be left to future research to address the limitations referred to above and to generalize our findings to other cultural settings, other public goods, and other elicitation formats like the payment card. Another promising avenue to explore would be to address the issue of uncertainty in the comparison of people's revealed and stated WTC time and money for a local public good. By applying the range-WTC, one could then analyze the magnitude of the hypothetical bias originating from uncertainty in both payment vehicles.
